Over the past three decades French judges and legislators have been asked, repeatedly, to address di cult questions pertaining to the political and social organization of gender, sexuality, and kinship. In particular, lawmakers have had to contend with the emergence and popularization of assisted reproductive technologies. While the legalization of contraception in and of abortion in brought to light the disjunction between sexuality and reproduction, new procedures such as surrogacy, sperm donation, and in vitro fertilization prompted an additional set of legal and ethical dilemmas. Not only have these technological inventions widened the divide between sexuality and reproduction but they have also challenged the long-standing de nitions of paternity, maternity, and liation established by the Civil Code.
Camille Robcis is assistant professor of European intellectual history at Cornell University. She is working on a book manuscript tentatively titled The Politics of Kinship: Anthropology, Psychoanalysis, and Family Law in Twentieth-Century France. In French civil law, " liation" does not simply refer to the biological link between parents and child. What is designated "legitimate liation" requires a legal act of "recognition" from the parents, who agree to provide their family surname and a portion of their inheritance. The Civil Code de ned maternity as the act of giving birth (mater semper certa est), while paternity was Moreover, the steady decline in marriage rates, the banalization of divorce and of single-parent households, and the growing acceptance of homosexuality have pushed the courts and the legislature to look beyond the heterosexual nuclear family to de ne and conceptualize reproduction.
France, of course, is not the only country where public o cials have had to take a stance on controversial issues such as medically assisted reproduction, divorce, bioethics, same-sex marriage, and transsexuality. However, as lawmakers in other countries turned to religion, tradition, or morality to oppose these procedures or to the language of equal rights to support them, various French politicians began referring to a new concept to think through these new questions of sexual politics: the "anthropological function of the law." The law, they insisted, did not simply exist to satisfy individual demands or to confer scattered "rights" to individuals. Rather, its primary purpose was to ensure the proper integration of individuals into the social world and to guarantee their psychic well-being. The law upheld the "symbolic order."
The Anthropological Function of the Law
Although none of the politicians who invoked this "anthropological function of the law" ever clearly de ned it, the term appeared to be derived from the idiosyncratic lexicon of Pierre Legendre, a legal scholar trained in Lacanian psychoanalysis, whose work draws on canon law, Roman law, structuralist anthropology, and psychoanalysis. According to Legendre, the Law with a capital L does not pertain exclusively to state institutions or to legislation. Rather, it is the fundamental principle underlying social exchange and regulating the construction of human subjectivity. To use one of the terms most recurrent in this eld of "legal anthropology," the Law's responsibility is to institute subjects. As another contemporary legal scholar, Alain Supiot, explains: "The primary meaning of instituting the human being is setting it on its feet, standing it upright, by inscribing it within a community of sense by which it is linked to other human beings. Instituting the human being means enabling it to occupy its place within humanity." In Legendre's words, the anthropological function of the law consists in tying together "the biological, the social, and the unconscious. To institute life is nothing other than to gain normative e ects from this process through which are played the great genealogical stakes, that is to say, the question of the bond [la problématique du lien] in humanity." Legendre's conceptualization of the Law is largely inspired by the writings of Jacques Lacan, who himself borrowed the notion from Claude Lévi-Strauss's Elementary Structures of Kinship and reworked it to apply to the psychoanalytic eld. In Lévi-Strauss's work, the Law essentially functions as a synonym for the incest prohibition, the universal "rule of rules" that forces men to marry outside their clan, to exchange their women, and ultimately, to establish social relations with other groups and families. Since the Law is premised on exogamy, sexual di erence is, in Lévi-Strauss's system of exchange, the condition of culture, of symbolic thought, of sociality, and, as Lévi-Strauss hints in the last pages the Elementary Structures, of language. As Lacan became increasingly interested in structural linguistics during the s in his attempt to rescue Freud's thought from what he perceived as the biologistic and humanistic impulses of ego psychology, he returned to Lévi-Strauss's concept of the law, made it a proper noun, and tied it to the Oedipus complex. As Lacan wrote in :
The primordial Law is therefore the Law, which, in regulating marriage ties, superimposes the reign of culture over the reign of nature, the latter being subject to the law of mating. The prohibition of incest is merely the subjective pivot of that Law. . . . This law, then, reveals itself clearly enough as identical to a language order. For without names for kinship relations, no power can institute the order of preferences and taboos that knot and braid the thread of lineage through the generations.
This structural equivalence between the law, the symbolic, kinship, the social, and sexual di erence informs much of Legendre's theories, as well as those of other contemporary legal scholars interested in this new eld of "dogmatic anthropology." One implication of this logical set, according to Legendre and many of these thinkers, is that any legal changes a ecting gender, sexuality, and the family would also necessarily a ect the social and the psyche, usually in noxious ways. As this discourse of legal anthropology was ltered into the legal and political worlds throughout the s and s, one of the arguments that began to circulate in the legislative debates around arti cial insemination, same-sex parenting, and surrogacy was that, to prevent the demise of the symbolic that would bring about a generalized state of social chaos and psychic distress, French elected o cials needed to defend the Law, or rather its "anthropological function." Ultimately, this meant that they needed to oppose any legislative measures that would a ect the traditional con nes of the heterosexual reproductive family.
Thus, in the parliamentary discussions preceding the "bioethics laws" that sought to regulate assisted reproductive technologies, Christine Boutin argued against the legalization of anonymous sperm donations on the basis that the "eviction of sexuality and anonymity would lead to a series of contradictions in liation law and to a destructing of kinship relations [une déstructuration du lien de parenté ]." Arti cial insemination, Boutin insisted, would not only a ect "our way of reproducing, but our way of thinking [notre façon de penser] ." Others suggested that children conceived by sperm donors, delivered by surrogate mothers, or raised by lesbians or single mothers were more likely to be psychotic because they would be missing the Name-of-the-Father.
The discourse warning against the dangers of producing "symbolically modi ed children" gained momentum in the late s as the French government debated the PACS, the Civil Pact of Solidarity, which allocated domestic partnership bene ts to unmarried heterosexual and homosexual couples alike. Similarly, in the legislative sessions leading up to the patronymic reform that ended the centuries-old mandate requiring all children to carry the name of their father, deputies opposed to the bill insisted on the importance of the father's name as a social and psychic support for the child. In the words of the representative Marie-Thérèse Boisseau, what was important was "the practical juridical function of the name as a marker of paternity, as well as its essential symbolic function." Citing the work of Françoise DekeuwerDéfossez, a family law professor and an important proponent of the anthropological function of the law, Boisseau reminded the Assembly that "the transmission of the paternal name allows us to socially balance kinship ties." In his analysis of this same law, the psychoanalyst Michel Schneider contended that the fundamental question was not one of equality between men and women but one of the "transmission of the status of subject." By refusing the symbolic position of the Nameof-the-Father, parents would con ne their children to the overwhelming and all-encompassing realm of the maternal, to the Real and the Imaginary, a space of nondistinction and of incest. "What is the name?" Schneider asked in a recent book, "This tiny thing transmitted by the father to prevent the mother from becoming everything [Ce presque rien que transmet le père pour que la mère ne soit pas tout]."
Within the logic of these arguments, the battles against these particular legal reforms centered on sexuality and reproduction were suddenly portrayed as battles for the preservation of the law in its very essence-or more speci cally, for its anthropological function, for the social and the psyche at once. Catherine Labrusse-Riou, a legal scholar who has written extensively on the symbolic function of the law, recounted that her interest in legal theory arose, signi cantly, in the context of her research on medically assisted procreation: "I realized very quickly that the bioethical a ected the law in its entirety, in its most fundamental notions, at least those of civil law." Similarly, Irène Théry, a sociologist who was hired by the government to evaluate the PACS in , condemned it precisely for what she perceived as this law's "desymbolizing passion." As she put it:
The law is not a simple management or policing tool [un simple outil de gestion ou de police]. It also has, maybe primarily, an instituting function, in the sense that it contributes to setting up, in the language of a common law, a certain number of fundamental anthropologi- This essay forms part of a larger project in which I trace the intellectual and political genealogy of structuralist concepts in French family law. In particular, I am interested in how legislators and social scientists came to endorse this vision of a universal and transhistorical "law" of kinship premised on sexual di erence and at the root of all social and psychic formations. Ultimately, my aim is to understand how they translated these extremely abstract and di cult concepts of anthropology and psychoanalysis into concrete legal measures and policy decisions. If this theory of kinship found its intellectual justi cation in a particular reading of Lévi-Strauss and Lacan, it also drew on a longer tradition of French sociology, which from Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Emile Durkheim, and Marcel Mauss on insisted on the speci city of "the social" and on the importance of heterosexual exchange for social integration. Moreover, this positioning of the family as the enactor of universality and sociality coincided in surprising ways with the structural positioning of the family in French civil law and public policy. Indeed, from the end of the nineteenth century, as fears of "depopulation" began Irène Théry, "Le contrat d'union sociale en question," Esprit, no.
. Théry also argues for the importance of rethinking and reinforcing the symbolic function of the law after the "turning point of the s and s" in the conclusion to her book on divorce, to agitate social reformers, to the s, French familialists lobbied steadily (often with the help of social scientists convened as "experts") to convince public o cials that the family was the best unit to organize solidarity and build political consensus, the most universal and most abstractable mode of social representation, the purest expression of the "general will." I suggest, in other words, that the family was the condition of sociality both in the structuralist and in the republican social contracts.
My intention in this article, however, is not so much to engage further with the arguments put forward by Legendre, Théry, or LabrusseRiou, or to explore how they might relate to this double articulation of the social contract, but to ask a more precise and speci cally historical question: Why did this rhetoric of the anthropological function of the law emerge in the context of these discussions around bioethics, nontraditional families, and liation law of the s and s? How did gender, sexuality, and reproduction become the privileged sites for rethinking legal theory, for reasserting a particular kind of social and psychic normativity, and for ultimately anchoring a new état de droit in France? To answer these questions, I propose to focus on two case studies in which the language of legal anthropology was deployed particularly forcefully: the work of a committee founded by François Mitterrand to study the new bioethical questions raised by reproductive technologies, and the challenges posed by transsexuality to French civil law. My aim is to show how, in both instances, lawyers, politicians, and activists began to employ a discourse of individual rights-or droits humains as the French referred to them-in the hopes of acquiring certain freedoms. I argue that the rhetoric of the anthropological function of the law was developed in reaction to this discourse of and demand for individual rights. By referencing the symbolic dimension Many scholars have commented on this role of the family in French social policy and on the importance of familialism and family policy to understand the development of welfare policies and "solidarity" more generally. See, e.g., the classic by Robert Talmy of the law, legal anthropologists contended that gender, sexuality, and reproduction did not pertain to particular human rights or to the private sphere of the individual but that they constituted the transhistorical and universal foundations of the public, the social, and the psychic. Ultimately, I want to suggest that these French theorists and politicians reframed human rights not as the prerogative of every person to live free of discrimination but as the "right" of all human beings to be integrated into a "symbolic order" de ned by a normative construction of heterosexuality.
Assisted Reproductive Technology and the Bioethics Debates
On February , , the rst French "test tube baby," Amandine, was born in a maternity clinic outside Paris. By that time "sperm banks" and fertility clinics were already operational in many French cities. In it was estimated that seven thousand children had been born by arti cial insemination in the previous ten years. The legal status of these children, particularly their liation, remained unaccounted for. In the summer of , the rst o cial surrogacy center had opened its doors to the public, despite the fact that the legality of surrogacy was still under dispute. The press followed each of these developments with acute interest. It became particularly captivated by the story of Sacha Geller, a doctor who had developed an ingenious plan to circumvent the various legal and ethical questions raised by surrogacy, speci cally in terms of these children's liation. Geller suggested that surrogate mothers be paid the minimum wage during their pregnancies. Moreover, he encouraged surrogates to give birth anonymously, relying on a particular clause of the Civil Code known as the accouchement sous X. Thus, if an infertile couple requested a surrogate, Geller would impregnate the surrogate with the sperm of the intended father. The child would be "born under x" with no o cial mother but would be recognized by the father at birth. Eventually, his wife would also be able to adopt the child, so that in legal terms, and in perfect accord with French liation laws, the baby would have one father and one mother only.
These new reproductive technologies, however, hardly generated unanimous enthusiasm. Many compared surrogacy to slavery. Others worried about giving individuals who would otherwise be unable to repro- duce (single women, homosexual couples, postmenopausal women) access to medically assisted procreation. For these skeptics, the legislature needed to impose limits and restrictions; it needed to outlaw certain procedures and to reserve others exclusively for married couples who had been diagnosed with infertility. In , to re ect on the many legal and ethical questions raised by medically assisted procreation, President Mitterrand founded a national ethics committee, the Comité Consultatif National d'Ethique pour les Sciences de la Vie et de la Santé (CCNE). At the president's request, this advisory body composed of prominent scientists, social scientists, legal experts, philosophers, theologians, and public health o cials organized a twoday colloquium titled "Genetics, Procreation, and the Law" in January . This was one of the rst instances in which legal scholars, in reference to the supposedly disastrous social and psychic e ects of surrogacy, anonymous sperm donation, and frozen embryos, and in reaction also to Geller's legal scheming, alluded to a particular anthropological function of French civil law. Since the CCNE had invited a number of public o cials, the colloquium also provided a forum for these legal scholars to interact with lawmakers, many of whom would later refer to the symbolic function of the law in the parliamentary debates and procedures that followed.
Jean Carbonnier, the former dean of the Faculty of Law at the Sorbonne and one of the most important law professors in France, claimed in his public intervention that although French civil law gave a central role to the notion of personal "will" (volonté ), the new modes of arti cial reproduction rested on a "highly individualistic philosophy." Carbonnier condemned the legal philosophy espoused by many advocates of assisted reproduction for whom the law appeared simply as a "cooperative of individual happinesses [une coopérative de bonheurs individuels]." The pursuit of happiness, however, was not "a properly legal notion in France, despite the fact that the term [was] inscribed in the U.S. Constitution." Instead, Carbonnier suggested, what was really at the heart of French law-particularly that of family law-was the "collective interest." "A more impalpable social interest is attached to liation law: by linking children to their parents, this law contributes to the cohesion, vertical and horizontal, of the entire social body." Along similar lines, Labrusse-Riou invoked the law's symbolic function to argue against the possibility of allowing unmarried individuals to have access to arti cial insemination:
Actes du colloque génétique, procréation et droit (Arles, ), -. Ibid., . Ibid., .
Single-parent arti cial procreation would force the jurist to found liation-which is paternal most of the time-on a purely genetic basis. This would not be opportune, especially at a time when we have tended to privilege, in arti cial procreation particularly, that which has always been the fundamental basis of kinship and which cannot be entirely subsumed in the biological [ce qui a toujours été l'élément fondamental de la parenté et qui n'est pas entièrement résumé dans le biologique]. A father and a mother are more than just genitors.
Among the government representatives invited to the colloquium was Robert Badinter, who was, at the time, the minister of justice. While Badinter avoided taking a public stand on these questions of bioethics during the CCNE colloquium, he did so a few weeks later in a talk titled "Human Rights in the Face of the Progress in Medicine, Biology, and Biochemistry," delivered at the Council of Europe on March , . Given the hesitation concerning medically assisted procreation that many of the legal scholars and social scientists had expressed at the CCNE colloquium, Badinter's speech appeared an unequivocal argument in favor of the liberalization of the new reproductive technologies. Indeed, for Badinter, medically assisted procreation for heterosexual married couples was relatively straightforward, in both ethical and legal terms. In such cases civil law would only need to be slightly adapted to permit one or both of the intended parents to adopt their child prior to the birth. A much more contentious issue, he argued, was the possibility of allowing single women to have children on their own, through an anonymous sperm donor, for instance. As he put it: "To give all human beings the freedom of using arti cial procreation technologies is ultimately to expand the possibilities for the woman to engender. More to the point, it is underlining the fact that while a man needs a woman to procreate, the woman, herself, might no longer need a man!" According to Badinter, it was this fear that one day a woman might no longer need a man to have a baby (or, to use his terms, the fear of "un masculin déclinant et une liberté declinée au seul féminin") that was really behind the opposition to arti cial insemination.
A second argument often invoked to prevent nonmarried individuals from accessing reproductive technologies was that it was in the child's best interest to have two parents. "To be sure," Badinter replied, for the child, two parents are most likely better than one. But what is the weight of this wise observation in our societies in which divorce Ibid., . Robert Badinter, "Les droits de l'homme face au progrès de la médecine, de la biologie et de la biochimie," Le débat, no.
is common, where a mother can choose to be single or to ignore everything about her partner, where we are not moved by the fate of children born out of a syphilitic woman marrying an alcoholic man? There is surely some paradox in invoking the child's interest to forbid him from being born.
Thus, Badinter continued, legislators needed to nd answers, not in this ctive "right of a child not yet born" or in sexist fears about women taking over society but in "our philosophy of human rights," the philosophy, he argued, underlying French law and "European civilization" more broadly.
To link human rights to the question of reproduction, Badinter singled out two rights in particular, both of which, he reminded us, were solidly inscribed in the European Convention on Human Rights. The rst, corresponding to Article , was the right to life. For Badinter, this formulation implied not only the right to live but also the right to give life and, consequently, the right to choose the means by which to do so. The second was Article , stipulating a right to intimité, which, in the English version of the convention, is translated as a "right to privacy." Thus, Badinter continued, if the French state were to limit reproductive technologies to married couples, it would do so in violation of Article , since one's marital status ultimately concerned one's private life, and, in one's private life, "every adult is an absolute master in our society. Our laws give him the right to be chaste or not, heterosexual or homosexual, to live alone or in a couple. And our laws guarantee the right for each one to not only lead the kind of private life one chooses but also to see the absolute respect of the intimacy of this private life." Given this de nition of privacy, which Badinter underscored was one of the cornerstones of French republicanism, banning single women from access to arti cial insemination would not only block their roads to personal ful llment or happiness (in his words, the voies de l'épanouissement). It was also an act of explicit discrimination and thus unacceptable in French law: "The right to give life cannot be denied to a woman who wants to have a child. We should thus not prohibit the means to do so. Unless we want to enter into a di erent type of society. And all discrimination in this regard, whether it has a theological, philosophical, or political foundation, can only be the source of human injustice."
The press reacted vigorously to Badinter's declarations. des Associations Familiales (UNAF), decried Badinter's "savage liberalism." Marcel Gauchet, the editor of Le débat, invited Badinter to publish his speech a few months later, in a special edition of his journal titled "Law, Medicine, and Life." Gauchet also asked ve "experts" in questions of reproduction-a biologist, a theologian, a scientist, an anthropologist, and a sociologist-to respond to Badinter. As Gauchet stated in his introductory editorial, what was at stake in these debates was the "de nition of individual rights, which is to say the political articulation between the living and the social." Despite the di erences in disciplines and methodologies among these ve respondents, all converged on an essential point: the legal framework of human rights could not provide an adequate basis for thinking through the problems of reproduction, gender, and sexuality. Anthropology, or at least a particular version of structuralist anthropology, could.
This vision of legal anthropology in which the law held a double structural function for the social and the psyche found one of its most compelling theorizations in the response of Françoise Héritier, a student of Lévi-Strauss and one of the most important contemporary anthropologists in France. Héritier's publications and public interventions, particularly during the "Genetics, Procreation, and Law" colloquium, were cited extensively throughout the bioethics debates. In her contribution to Le débat, Héritier contended that Badinter's argument rested on a fundamental confusion between engendrement, the biological fact of reproduction, and liation, the legal act through which paternity and maternity were inscribed into the social order. Speaking "as an anthropologist," she explained that "there are no societies, to my knowledge, which have not distinguished the social roles of Pater and Mater that establish liation from the physiological functions of genitor/ genitrix, in other words, liation from engenderment." While engendrement could indeed be understood as a private choice, liation was, by de nition, public, since it was the legal translation of a norm previously de ned by the community. And as a norm, liation had always (i.e., in "Pour ou contre les mères porteuses," Le quotidien de Paris, Mar. , . Marcel Gauchet, introductory editorial, Le débat, no.
( ). Héritier was Lévi-Strauss's successor at the Collège de France, where she occupied the chair of Comparative Studies of African Societies from to . During these years, she also directed the Laboratoire d'Anthropologie Sociale, founded by Lévi-Strauss in and attached to the Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales. Héritier, one of the most in uential "experts" on social questions, has served on numerous governmental committees, among which we can list the Conseil National du Sida, the Conseil Economique et Social, the Haut Conseil de la Population et de la Famille, and the Conseil de l'Association Française des Femmes. She has often commented on her role as an expert, as a scholar engaged with the "problèmes de la Cité." See, e.g., her recent collection of interviews, Une pensée en mouvement (Paris, As Héritier put it, "the social can never be reduced to the biological." This by no means implied, however, that all biological con gurations could or should be legally acceptable: "If liation is cut from, or at least does not necessarily stem from engendering, it is nonetheless substantially linked to the idea of a bisexuated reproduction, which is to say that it necessarily refers to the paternal and maternal status as the supports of the a liation to the group. The idea of the thing is more important than the reality [L'idée de la chose prime sur la réalité ]." As this last statement suggests, the crux of the problem for Héritier was not of an empirical nature. From a purely biological standpoint, all kinds of kinship permutations were possible and imaginable, and indeed, Héritier cited the growing number of single-parent households in the s as an example. The main issue, however, concerned the normative, the "idea of the thing," which, for Héritier, was inevitably rooted in sexual di erence. Thus, what di erentiated a married couple unable to conceive and having to resort to medically assisted procreation from a single woman desiring to have a child on her own was that the former, by having committed to marriage, had also somehow committed to this normative imperative, to this "idea of the thing," to what Héritier designated as the "arbitrary or arti ce of the social": "It is evident to me that the crucial element to make this distinction is the previously expressed will of the partners inscribed in a matrimonial status [l'élément fondamental qui sert de pierre de touche pour opérer ce partage est la volonté préalablement exprimée par les partenaires, inscrits dans un statut matrimonial ], that is to say, in the arbitrary or the arti ce of the social." From this claim we can deduce that the law is the mechanism responsible for institutionalizing this "arbitrary and arti cial" nature of the social, a social made possible only through sexual di erence, or Ibid., . Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. more precisely here, through heterosexual marriage. Thus, according to Héritier's argument, unmarried women wanting to have children on their own posed a problem, not at the level of nature or biology, but at the level of culture. In other words, they were the ones imprisoned in "biologism" for refusing to comply with the "arbitrary and arti cial" dimension of the social.
The exchange between Héritier and Badinter brought to light not only two con icting visions of kinship, but also two con icting notions of social organization and normativity. While Badinter based his argument on a de nition of marriage as pertaining to "private life," Héri-tier's response presented marriage and heterosexual kinship as the condition of sociality. Far from belonging to "one's private life," marriage and kinship constituted the very essence of the social: they were the public. As such, privacy or human rights-which, Héritier suggested, were for Badinter closer in spirit to "individual rights"-could not possibly provide an adequate framework for legislating sexuality and reproduction:
The individual who enjoys human rights is an anonymous, abstract, asexual [asexué ], nontemporal being: he is a pure bearer of rights, him alone. However, in the act of engendering, one has to admit that the abstract individual is at the same time active and passive: the one who procreates and the one who is procreated [dans l'acte d'engendrer, il faut bien admettre que l'individu abstrait est à la fois partie prenante et partie prise: celui qui procrée et celui qui est procrée]. By this simple observation, we are sent back to a fundamental philosophy: it is impossible to think pure individuality, either intellectually or socially. The individual can only be thought of in relation to the Other, to others. Thinking the individual thus stumbles over the relation, which immediately involves the very essence of the social [La pensée de l'individu achoppe donc sur la relation, laquelle implique immé-diatement l'essence même du social ].
Although Héritier described Badinter's invocation of human rights as "generous," she warned against the terrible consequences of conducting social policy along these lines. On a psychic level, individuals could not be "instituted"-or "integrated"-into the social. On a social level, this would result in chaos, in a fragmented world in which "anything goes" and "everyone marches to the beat of their own drum." As she concluded her essay: Robert Badinter's interpretation of human rights is certainly a vector of freedom, and it is profoundly generous, but it makes the individual a self-enclosed monad, the unique reference for being in the Ibid., . Ibid., .
world. As such, it is contrary to the goal we should strive for, of altruism and solidarity. This is, without doubt, a utopian point of view, to the extent that it misunderstands or misconstrues the very notion of the social. However, the individual can never be thought alone: he exists only in relation [il n'existe qu'en relation]. There only needs to be a relation between two individuals for the social to exist. [Moreover, the social] is never the simple sum of the rights of each of its members but an arbitrary dimension constituted by rules, in which liation (social) can never be reduced to the purely biological.
The idea that the liberalization of medically assisted reproduction-or, more speci cally, the legal recognition of nontraditional forms of kinship made possible by assisted reproduction-would be tantamount to the destruction of the social and to psychosis was one of the recurring themes in the other contributions to this issue of Le débat. All of the scholars asked to respond to Badinter insisted on the excessive "individualism" and "liberalism" of his legal approach, which they opposed to a more "anthropological" vision of the law, one that would ground the individual and the social at once. The biologist Antoine Danchin, once again positioning himself on the side of culture, argued that the main object of the law should be not biology but culture, since "it is impossible to speak of man while making an abstraction of his culture." While Danchin acknowledged that the scientist in him was drawn to biological experimentation and possibilities, "as a man," he explained, "what really counts is cultural kinship, not biological kinship." Indeed, he continued:
What counts for the creation of a balanced, if not stable, social group is the individual feeling of an identity. This feeling is constructed throughout childhood, through the assimilation of sociocultural markers [repères] that allow each of us to make choices. The possibility of making choices is the very foundation of freedom. But nobody can choose without rules. In our societies, written law is a sort of concrete explanation of these rules. As such, the law allows each of us to have an identity and to belong to a de ned social group.
In an interesting passage echoing Héritier's assertion that the "idea of the thing" was more important than the thing itself-in other words, that the normative trumped the empirical-Danchin suggested that "we must be capable of admitting the arbitrariness of our laws, and their provisional nature. But that does not in any way dispense us from Ibid., . Antoine Danchin, "Nature ou culture?" Le débat, no.
( ): . Ibid. Ibid., . observing them." Among these rules, arbitrary and yet inviolable, Danchin mentioned one in particular: "The rst rule that a society should put forward is the preservation of diversity. . . . This would also mean, for man, the preservation of sexual di erence." It is this notion of the law rhetorically assimilated to the social and to sexual di erence that Danchin opposed to Badinter's "positivism," which, he argued, overlooked fundamental anthropological transcendentals:
It is as the result of a profound positivist illusion, which tends to confuse our desires with reality, by making us believe in a de nitive and totally objecti ed form of knowledge, that we could choose to submit our ethics to scienti c knowledge. It seems to me that a more healthy realism would show us how much our knowledge is tributary to one of our biological particularities, which is our capacity for language and for the formation of cultures. This opposition between individualism and sociality also underlay the contribution of Olivier de Dinechin, a theologian who turned not to religion but to anthropology to refute Badinter:
We must hence arrive at the question of liation. To engender, to postulate a son, a daughter, mother and father, is a foundational human reality. Its juridical manifestation is only a surface formality. It has psychological, relational, social, cultural, and spiritual dimensions, which are the object of specialized approaches that prove its consistency. Like all great anthropological realities, however, it is enigmatic, that is to say, it carries aporias [porteuse d'apories] that constantly raise questions about it.
Like Héritier and Danchin, Dinechin reproached Badinter for conceiving of the law as a simple "game of formalities," for "proposing to displace ethical norms under the robe of a juridical extension [le déplacement de normes éthiques sous le vêtement d'une extension juridique]," for his "cultural relativism," and for his "accentuated individualism [that] goes toward the logic of a certain liberal philosophy." As he put it, "every person is, to be sure, an absolute, and a pole of inalienable rights. However, these rights are not unlimited; they are measured by the commitment [engagement] that the person must take in relation to the other."
As the responses by Héritier, Danchin, and Dinechin make clear, it was Badinter's appeal to human rights that encouraged them to turn to anthropology to argue for a di erent understanding of "man" and the law, but also of society. Writing at the end of the s, LabrusseRiou emphasized the need for a new legal theory to account for the profound changes in the elds of gender, sexuality, and reproduction: "What is missing, dramatically, in our thought is the foundation of the limit. Human rights in their various manifestations cannot account for this. . . . What we will need are new juridical categories that we will have to elaborate to attempt to regulate this power over life." Unless jurists could elaborate these "new legal categories" to think through sexual politics, the law would remain purely "positivistic" in content: Here again, Labrusse-Riou assimilates human rights, legal positivism, social deregulation, and what she describes as the psychic malaise of the subject caught in the "excessive individualism of Western societies." And, indeed, since these debates on bioethics began in the s, Labrusse-Riou (along with Legendre, Supiot, and other legal theorists) has devoted much of her work to the creation of these "new legal categories" that would supersede the discourse of human rights. Although this new legal philosophy inspired by structural anthropology and psychoanalysis would not necessarily emanate from a position of consensus, it would ultimately provide one. As she explained in another article on bioethics, in a language reminiscent of mysticism: Even if the origins or the foundations of its legitimacy remain partly enigmatic, the principle of a normativity, articulated around values, implicit or not, and the requirement of a coherence among the elements composing the genealogic institution, are vital for individuals as for society. We know this is necessary from sources localizable by experience, knowledge, conviction, but not veri able by experimental science. Their functions stem not only from the operative e cacy [l'e cacité opératoire], or even from a positive demonstration of their grounding. In today's jargon, we speak of a symbolic order, a sort of normativity that is objective because it is exterior to the individual and yet protective of its person within a culture that cannot be completely relativistic.
Transsexuality beyond the Privacy Principle
If the so-called bioethics debates can help us understand why legal theorists and social scientists would turn to this notion of anthropology in their attempt to counteract the discourse of human rights, the question remains why this new eld of legal anthropology emerged in the s. After all, Badinter was not the rst to invoke human rights in relation to sexuality and reproduction. Throughout the s and s, feminist groups, and in particular the Mouvement de Libération des Femmes, insisted on a woman's right to choose. Yet, in the writings of these legal thinkers, whether it be Legendre, Labrusse-Riou, Théry, or Héritier, neither abortion nor contraception appears to have had the same shattering e ect on French law or the same apocalyptic social and psychic consequences. By the time reproductive technologies, same-sex parenting, and sex-reassignment surgery had become social realities, the context appeared to have changed. Why, then, did this retour du droit or retour au droit occur in the s? To address this question, I would like to turn to the work of the legal scholar Denis Salas, whose book Subject of Flesh and Subject of Law provides an account of this shift. Just as bioethics served as a platform to rethink legal theory for scholars such as Labrusse-Riou, transsexuality o ered Salas (who, unlike many of the legal scholars previously mentioned, is a magistrat with no particular specialty in family law) a case study to analyze the contemporary crisis of the "subject of law" (sujet de droit). "If we consider that liation, sex, and genealogy constitute the very backbone of the subject," Salas explained, with transsexuality, "the fracture is obvious." The same year as Salas's book was published, Labrusse-Riou also re ected on the threat that transsexuality posed to the psychic and social orders. It was "fallacious," she contended, to talk about "transsexual rights" modeled on human rights because gender and sexuality did not pertain to "private life." Rather, because transsexuality involved sexual di erence, it a ected everyone: it had a direct social impact and public implications:
It is impossible, unless we wish to destroy all conjugal and genealogic institutions, to consider that transsexualism pertains to private life, when the civil status of others Here again, the legal context in which both this article and Salas's book were written can be enlightening. In March the European Court of Human Rights ruled that France was in violation of Article of the European Convention on Human Rights, the article protecting privacy, in the case of Line B. As a male-to-female transsexual operated on in the early s, Line B. had, for seventeen years, fought in the French court system to change the sex on her o cial documentation. Salas carefully establishes, from the introduction on, that he condemns not transsexuality per se but the idea that a "right to privacy" justi es modifying one's état civil, since gender and sexuality are, in his argument, intrinsically public. In that sense, his objections to privacy resemble the ones previously mentioned in the context of kinship. In particular, Salas insists on the importance of the law to uphold a normative ideal instead of trying to satisfy all individual demands: "That the law ought to accommodate [s'arranger] sociological reality is in some ways its vocation.
[But] that the rule be legitimized by the demands of a su ering minority . . . carries the risk of sliding toward a purely utiliDenis Salas, Sujet de chair et sujet de droit: La justice face au transsexualisme (Paris, ), . Labrusse-Riou, "Sciences de la vie et légitimité," . Ibid.,
. Labrusse-Riou is playing here with the double meaning of état as physical state and as legal status (as in état civil ).
tarian function of the law whose only mission would be to prevent suffering. All of its symbolic function would be absent."
Salas's book is most useful for my purposes here because it o ers a chronology, a narrative that accounts for this "crisis of the law" to which his work, and legal anthropology more generally, responds. While Salas holds biotechnologies (in this case, the possibility of surgically changing one's sex) responsible for the accentuation of the crisis, the true culprits in his book are "individualism" and the "rule of the private me" [le moi privé ]. Salas is never clear on the exact origins of this "mass individualism," which he at times attributes to the emergence of "modernity," at other times to the Enlightenment, and at still other times to the period of the s and s. Indeed, starting in the s, Salas tells us, the law was subjected to a double attack. On one front, Marxism and Marxist theory reduced the law to a mere tool of exploitation for the dominant classes. On a second front, poststructuralism-or, as Salas calls it, the pensée -presented the law as a " nished episode in the history of power to the bene t of ourishing disciplinary technologies [un épisode révolu de l'histoire du pouvoir au pro t des technologies disciplinaires foisonnantes]." Caught in this dichotomy, the "subject of law" could only be articulated in two ways: as an insigni cant entity within a homogenized and oppressive "whole" or as an autonomous individual governed exclusively by his or her own desires. In one extreme, the social had the potential to become totalitarian, as was the case with communism and fascism. In the other extreme, collective life was "further atomized" and "any demanded freedom . . . emptied from all substance." In both instances, the individual experienced alienation and psychic distress.
According to Salas, the decisive break in this history of the law came with the end of the "totalitarian experience" and the fall of Marxism-in other words, toward the late s. At this point, a new concept of the law could emerge: "No longer con ated with power or with the state, the law as a public space in which common norms are elaborated, interpreted, and applied could, little by little, regain a central place." The law-once again equated with the social and the public-could function as a "reference" for the subject confronted with the "mass individualism of the end of the century," a subject increasingly lost. Salas, Sujet de chair et sujet de droit, . Ibid., -. Ibid., . The reference to "disciplinary technologies" is, of course, an allusion to Michel Foucault's theory of power as pervasive and ubiquitous.
Ibid., -. Ibid., . Ibid., .
Moreover, the law could overcome the double bind of Marxism and poststructuralism by thinking the individual and the social no longer in opposition or as interchangeable but as working together. Only the law, serving as an anchor point for both the social and the psyche, could "organize a nondivisive relation to the other and to oneself [rapport indivisible à l'autre et à soi-même]." It is with this particular understanding of the law that Salas addresses the various legal issues raised by transsexuality, from the surgical intervention to the modi cations of o cial documents. Salas's point is not that transsexual demands are wrong or misplaced, since, as he puts it, transsexual su ering is "real." However, as a magistrate and a scholar, he is interested in the kinds of responses that the court (and, indirectly, the state) should give to this emerging discourse of "transsexual rights." In this context, invoking a particular "right to privacy," as was the case in the Line B. trial, is unsatisfactory, since it only deepens the "crisis of representation" at the root of the transsexual suffering. Thus the law needs to help these su ering "subjects of esh"-subjects caught in the whims of their desire-to become "subjects of law." It needs to institute them into the social order, integrate them into the world of common signi cations, into a symbolic order ultimately anchored in sexual di erence:
What is at play here is the integration of the subject of esh into the collective representation of the body where his symbolic unity can be forged [Ce qui se joue ici c'est l'intégration du sujet de chair dans la repré-sentation collective du corps où se forge son unité symbolique]. The subject can only receive his identity by experimenting and communicating with an outside that assigns him a place in the network of human communication where our identity is tied [cet ailleurs que lui-même qui lui assigne une place dans le réseau de la communication humaine où se noue notre identité ]: liation and sexual di erence. We are assigned as subjects of law to this double di erentiation between generations and sexes, given by our parents, inscribed in the law, and reinforced [rappelée] by the judge.
Because sexual di erence lies at the origin of all systems of exchange, including sociality and language, the purpose of the law is to constantly reassert this anthropological reality so that the transsexual subject can learn to renarrate his or her identity in the social world:
The entry into a symbolic world supposes that we leave behind the symptom, which has meaning only for oneself to join the world of signi cations shared by all. The symbolic function of the law for the Ibid., . Ibid., . subject is the ability to place all human exchange under a law that forces us to actualize this rule and that situates us in the reciprocity of this exchange. If we place ourselves outside this exchange, the di erence that is lost-the division of the sexes-can bring about the loss of all di erences.
As an example of this "deregulated circulation of signs, sexes, and codes that makes it impossible to represent the world," Salas mentions Balzac's novella Sarrasine, in which "things and beings submerged in an 'unstoppable metonymy' [métonymie e rénée] can no longer be separated, individualized, distributed. It is to neutralize the risk of disarticulating human identity by a devastating imaginary that we must nd the forgotten symbolic part [C'est pour neutraliser le risque de désarticula-tion de l'identité humaine par un imaginaire dévastateur qu'il faut retrouver la part symbolique oubliée]." Practically speaking, it is never exactly clear what the legal translation of this "entry into the symbolic" would look like. However, accepting the normativity of sexual di erence through this process of symbolization is presented as the only way to live in a social context, to exist in history:
The subject of law . . . marks the symbolic of an entity at once carnal and relational, which imposes duties on us. It cannot be assimilated to any living being characterized by its capacity to feel and to su er as it has been de ned by utilitarianism. It is reducible neither to biological determinism nor to sociopsychological interpretations, a sterile oscillation in which so many interpreters of transsexuality have lost themselves. Finding its dignity in the privilege of not being interpreted, the subject of law is neither the unconscious subject of psychoanalysis nor the su ering subject of medicine. He is neither the user of public services nor the entitled self of the welfare state [ni l'usager de service public, ni l'ayant droit de l'Etat-providence] . He is also not the mere recipient of subjective rights. Beyond these dismemberments, it is the part of ourselves engaged in public space. It is a subject actually or virtually autonomous, free, and capable of answering for his own actions. He is a mutual engagement placed under the observation of a third party that guarantees all pacts [Il est un engagement mutuel placé sous le regard d'un tiers, garant des pactes]. As the subject of his history, he articulates his identity with the responsibility of his past actions and his commitments for future actions.
Ibid., . Ibid. We can note here that Salas's choice of Sarrasine as the literary example of "deregulated circulation of signs, sexes, and codes" is signi cant, since Sarrasine was also famously studied by Roland Barthes in his work, S/Z. Barthes's text is often considered one of the rst examples of poststructuralist literary criticism, which, for Salas, appears to be synonymous with the pensée . Salas, Sujet de chair et sujet de droit, .
The opposition between subjective rights (or privacy) and the welfare state is important because it points to a larger dichotomy underlying Salas's argument, and many of those previously mentioned: that between an "Anglo-Saxon" model and a French republican form of social organization. It is not incidental that every time Salas and most of the other legal scholars I have mentioned refer to "privacy," they leave the term in English, as if the concept were untranslatable. It is also relevant to note that two other dossiers accompanied the issue of Le débat on "Law, Medicine, and Life"-one titled "The Opacity of the United States," the other, "Faced with the Soviet Union." In this triangular relation with the United States (as a metaphor for unbridled liberalism, individualism, and anomie) and the Soviet Union (standing for a homogenized and oppressive social), the French republic epitomizes the "third party that guarantees all pacts," the only political in which the social and the individual are not thought in opposition but as working together, in unity and cohesion. From this perspective, legal anthropology appears as the corollary of the French republic, just as positive law, human rights, and privacy come to operate as synonyms for liberalism and the United States.
Privacy in Translation
From an American standpoint, the rhetorical con ation of privacy, liberalism, and the "Anglo-Saxon model," on one side (as the Soviet reference falters after ), and of sexual di erence, sociality, and French republicanism, on the other, seems doubly puzzling. First, the rejection of privacy as a foreign concept imported into French law is surprising given that, aside from a few exceptions, the majority of French intellectuals still consider the distinction between public and private one of the most distinctive characteristics of Frenchness. From this perspective, respect for one's "private life" is what sets French society in polar opposition to American communautarisme. In fact, many scholars of France have observed this reluctance of the French to consider the private as anything other than a transparent and self-evident category, encompassing everything from sexuality to religion and race. "Privacy" was one of the arguments mobilized by the supporters of the law banning "ostentatious" religious signs (and in particular, the Islamic hijab) in schools. For the unconditional supporters of this version of laïcité, religion belonged to the private sphere of the home, but not in the school, a quintessentially public space designed to mold future French republican citizens. Similarly, it was under the banner of privacy that many intellectuals and politicians on the left (including Théry) opposed the PACS. Théry's argument against the PACS equated homosexuality with the private, thus not requiring state recognition. Privacy was also invoked as the distinctive marker of Frenchness during the American "sex scandals" of the s, involving rst Clarence Thomas and then Bill Clinton. For many French commentators, these a airs were symptomatic of an American obsession with politicizing the private. They inevitably contrasted this obsession to the French respect of "private life," exempli ed, for instance, in the laissez-faire attitude around Mitterrand's mistress and illegitimate daughter.
Second, while it is certainly correct that many "Anglo-Saxon" liberal thinkers have valorized privacy as a privileged location of individual self-expression-and, in this context, of sexual self-expressionthis understanding of privacy has been under attack in the United States, from both the left and the right, for at least the last thirty years. More paradoxical is the fact that much of the left-wing academic critique of privacy in the United States, originally emerging out of the feminist rearticulation of the private as the political, turned to French poststructuralist theory in the s, and in particular to Michel Foucault, whose work on the history of sexuality insisted on the mutually constitutive nature of the private and the public. Thus, many American scholars have anchored their critiques of a liberal de nition of privacy in a re ection around gender and sexuality. Yet their intention was never to reify the foundational status of sexual di erence for the social order; rather, they aimed to explore how gender and sexuality could o er new platforms to render the private, in all of its nonnormative con gurations, politically legible and relevant in the public sphere.
These cross-Atlantic translations and mistranslations suggest that privacy and human rights are never self-evident, timeless, or universal. Instead, they appear as historical and political categories, as discursive constructions adapted to particular times and contexts. The historian and legal scholar James Whitman develops this point in a fascinating comparison of Continental and American privacy law. Far from being a human "intuition," as many privacy advocates (relying on moral philosophy) have implied, privacy reveals contrasting political and social ideals in Europe and in the United States. More speci cally, Whitman argues, while privacy in Continental law has been primarily concerned with the protection of personal dignity, privacy in the United States has been much more oriented toward values of liberty, and especially liberty against the state. In fact, as Whitman makes clear in his analysis of the development of French privacy law from to , even under France's more "liberal" regimes, privacy law has always resisted "in the name of 'honor,' [the] two fundamental values of American liberty: the value of free speech and the value of private property as distributed through the market." As Whitman's case studies indicate, this concern for "dignity" (which, according to Whitman, is not so much a product of the post-World War II reaction against fascism as it is a concept shaped by the sharply hierarchical societies of the early modern period) has always masked a concern for social norms, for preserving the unity and coherence of the "community."
The social body and social norms were clearly at stake in the debates around medically assisted procreation and transsexuality. As lawyers and politicians speaking on behalf of minority communities (whether it be homosexuals, transsexuals, or single mothers) tested the elasticity of this meaning of privacy in the hope of acquiring certain rights, other legal scholars abandoned the concept. Instead, they turned to structuralism in hopes of nding the "new juridical categories" that Labrusse-Riou called for, categories that would presumably protect the integrity of the French social body. Whether this democratizing impetus came from within France (as in the examples of Geller and Badinter) or from outside (as in the ruling of the European Court of Human Rights in favor of Line B.), in both cases sexual politics provided a eld and a language to ght over the meaning and model of French republicanism, to argue over social norms and the kind of "community" that France was becoming. In the face of encroaching "European" or "American" law and culture (whether the encroaching was phantasmatic or real), legal anthropology o ered a discourse to rea rm French uniqueness, a means to reinstate republican sovereignty and cultural identity.
Sexual Di erence and the Critique of Human Rights
In Gauchet, the previously mentioned editor of Le débat, published an article titled "Human Rights Are Not a Politic." In this piece, Gauchet elaborated one of the most forceful and in uential critiques of human rights understood as individual civil rights. Salas's introduction to Subject of Flesh and Subject of Law and his attack on privacy are in fact almost directly imported from Gauchet's piece, which also begins with an analysis of the impact of Marxism and poststructuralism on social and political theory. "Should human rights be a politic [une politique], our politic?" Gauchet asked. In emphasizing the "our" here, Gauchet suggested, the society at stake was France. His question can thus be reformulated as follows: "Should civil rights provide the basis for theorizing the French political in the wake of poststructuralism and the collapse of Marxism?" Gauchet answered this question with an unambiguous no:
Here lies the greatest peril concealed by this return to human rights: to fall back into the rut [l'ornière] and the impasse of a theory of the individual against society, to succumb to the old illusion that we can Although this falls outside the scope of this article, one could point to many interesting parallels between these debates on sexual politics and those on the voile. Not only was the voile depicted as a foreign import (in this case, from "radical Islam") but it also challenged the division of public and private that was at the heart of laïcité. Here again, many turned to "republicanism" in an attempt to reinstate a distinction that was no longer operative in this particular case (was wearing the hijab a private or a public act? Like Salas, Gauchet lists the devastating e ects that this emphasis on human rights would have on the social, where individuals, increasingly delinked from one another, are forced to adhere to communities of interest (or communautarisme in its French label), and on psyches, increasingly prone to depression, psychosis, and paranoia. Individual autonomy, according to Gauchet, has only brought more "collective heteronomy" and more alienation, with alienation taken in its literal meaning as a "privative disjunction between the individual point of view and the collective point of view." Unless theory can rethink the individual in conjunction with the social, Gauchet predicts the "reinforcement of the role of the state, the accentuation of social anonymity, the further aggravation of the lack of interest for public a airs [l'aggravation encore du désintérêt pour la chose publique], and the anguished banalization of behaviors." Thus, returning to my original question of why this discourse of the anthropological function of the law came to be so prevalent in the eld of sexual politics after the s, I would argue that legal anthropology o ered precisely this alternative social model sought by Gauchet, one compatible with French republicanism and premised on sexual di erence. Gauchet, in another text, speci cally refers to Lévi-Strauss and Lacan as "masters" who can help us "build a bridge between the theories of societies and those of the psyche, via the notion of structure," by "taking into consideration language that presents this very particular interest of being at the same time irreducibly personal and purely social, without it being possible to separate the two sides of the same coin." This theory that Gauchet calls a "transcendental anthroposociology" is essentially what legal anthropology sought to enact in the legal eld. On a theoretical level, it avoided the "impasses" of Marxism and poststructuralism by insisting on the interdependence of the individual and the social. On a political level, it functioned as an alternative to totalitarianism and to American-style liberalism, as an escape from social homogenization and social warfare, as a new mode of expression for republican sovereignty. Legal anthropology could hence provide a new Gauchet, Le démocratie contre elle-même, . Ibid., . Ibid. Marcel Gauchet, La condition historique (Paris, ), . Ibid., . political framework, a new politique, one that would foster solidarity and inspire individuals to participate in the res publica, not as defenders of their own particular interests, but as abstract citizens capable of embodying the collective good. While human rights could no longer constitute a politic for France, sexual di erence, it seemed, suddenly could.
